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THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION
FOR INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES: AN EXPERIMENT
IN REFUGEE PROTECTION AND CONTROL
by Arthur C. Helton*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1975, the flight of Vietnamese boat people has remained a
chronic characteristic of refugee affairs in Asia. An international
conference in 1979 on Indochinese refugees initially achieved an
equilibrium to control the flow of refugees. 1 This international
arrangement provided that countries in the region would give temporary
refuge, and assured these nations that the refugees would ultimately be
resettled abroad. 2 This plan began to unravel in 1987 when arrivals in
the region outstripped diminishing resettlement commitments, 3 resulting
in a concerted push-back policy undertaken by the Thai authorities and the
initiation of screening and detention policies in Hong Kong.'
An effort to reach a new arrangement was made at a conference
in 1989 on Indochinese refugees.' This conference approved a plan to
introduce screening of refugees on a regional basis, countenanced the
possibility of detention pending adjudication, and raised the prospect of
return, including compulsory return, to Vietnam.6 Some of the new
* Director of the Refugee Project, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New
York City; member New York Bar; A.B. 1971, Columbia University; J.D. 1976, New
York University. This article is based on a paper which the author delivered at a
conference in August of 1990 on International Law and Refugees in the Asia-Pacific
Region, sponsored by the Asian Law Centre of the University of Melbourne and the
Australian Institute for International Affairs.
1. Helton, Asylum and Refugee Protection in Thailand, 1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 20,
26 (1989).
2. Id.at 25.
3. Id. at 26.
4. Id. at 27-28; see also LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RioHTS, INHUMANE
DETERRENCE: THE TREATMENT OF VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG 10-11
(1989) [hereinafter INHUMANE DETERRENCE].

5. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: International
Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, Report of the Secretary-General (Item 11 l(c) of
the Provisional Agenda), U.N. Doc. A/44/523 (1989) [hereinafter International
Conference].
6. Id.
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arrangements risk in their implementation being incompatible with
international refugee and human rights law. The prospects for resolution
of both these protection issues as well as the refugee problem itself remain
uncertain. This article will discuss these questions, while defining the
utility of legal protection in the search for a comprehensive solution.
II.

THE FLIGHT OF VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE
FROM 1975 TO THE PRESENT

Fifteen years after the fall of Saigon, the displacement of the
Vietnamese people remains a continuing experience. South Vietnam
surrendered on April 30, 1975, and a stream of Vietnamese began to
leave." Those who left between 1975 and 1977 included members of the
middle class, peasantry and the Saigon military." Reasons for flight
included harsh treatment, "re-education" of those associated with the old
regime, deterioration of living conditions including food shortage,
drought, flood, and a desire to avoid military service under the new
regime.' In 1978, the subjection of Sino-Vietnamese and other minorities
within Vietnam to hardship and deprivation gave new impetus to the
flight. By 1979, some 600,000 Vietnamese had left. 10
III.

ARRANGEMENTS MADE AT THE
ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

1979 CONFERENCE

The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis for the boat people in
Asia in 1979 provided the impetus for the world to address the problem.
Reacting to the large numbers of asylum-seekers arriving, countries in the
region refused to allow them to land, and thousands of Vietnamese
perished in the South China Sea."
On May 31, 1979, the British Prime Minister proposed to the
Secretary General of the United Nations that an international conference
7.
8.
9.
10.
161-66

Helton, supra note 1, at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22; see also Wain, The Indo-China Refugee Crisis, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 160,
(1979). In terms of recent reports of conditions in Vietnam, see AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL, VIETNAM: RENOVATION, THE LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE

1980's (1990); see also AURORA FOUNDATION, VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: APRIL 1975-DECEMBER 1988 (1990).
11. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, UNCERTAIN HARBORS: THE PLIGHT OF
VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE 4 (1987).
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be convened to deal with the problem." The Secretary General and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees held consultations with
several governments. 13 As a result, a meeting was called, and sixty-five
countries attended the conference from June 20-21, 1979.4 In his
opening statement, the Secretary General underlined the crucial
importance of maintaining the joint principles of "first asylum" and "nonrefoulement" for refugees arriving either by land or by sea. 5 He also
recognized that countries of asylum expected reassurance that refugees
would be resettled abroad. 16
As a result of enforcement efforts undertaken by the Vietnamese
government to stop unauthorized departures, the rate of departure fell
from approximately 25,000 per month from January to July, to about
4,000 per month from August to December. 7 The 1979 arrangement
stabilized the situation and established a framework in which to consider
the problem.
The number of arrivals fell, but governments
correspondingly reduced resettlement quotas,"2 and the issue largely
dropped out of public discussion.

IV.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE

1979 ARRANGEMENTS

The 1979 arrangements began to unravel when arrivals outstripped
resettlement in 1987.'" From 1986 to 1987, the number of Vietnamese
boat people arriving in Thailand tripled.'
In late 1987, Thai
government officials announced that no more boat people would be
permitted to enter Thailand and that vessels attempting to land would be
sent back out to sea. 1 In January, Thai officials presided over a "push

12. Helton, supra note 1, at 24.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Office of the U.N. High Commissionerfor Refugees, Meeting on Refugees and
DisplacedPersons in South-East Asia, convened by the Secretary-Generalof the U.N.
at Geneva, on 20 and 21 July 1979, and Subsequent Developments, Report of the
Secretary-General (Agenda Item 83) para. 15, at 6, U.N. Doe. A/34/627 (1989)
[hereinafter DisplacedPersons Report].
16. Id.
17. B. WAiN, THE REFuSED: THE AOONY OF THE INDOCHINA REFUGEES 8 (1989).
18. Helton, supra note 1, at 25.
19. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 8.
20. Id.
21. Helton, supra note 1, at 28.
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off' of refugees at Khlong Yai port and deputized local fishermen to join
the effort.'
During the first weeks of Thailand's push-back policy,
hundreds of asylum-seekers were victimized. Those who managed to
evade the naval blockade or ramming by Thai fishing boats were
abandoned on barren islands without food, water or medicine.'
Thai
officials estimated that some 1,000 refugees had been forced back to
sea.

24

A Memorandum of Understanding signed in Bangkok on April 20,
1988, between the Thai government and the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) arranged for the provision
of shelter for boat people who land in Thailand.' Asylum-seekers were
to be consolidated in a camp near the Thai-Cambodian border.' They
were not eligible, however, for resettlement abroad.'
In Hong Kong, arrivals began to outstrip resettlement in 1986,
when Vietnam suspended its orderly departure program to the United
States.28 As the number of refugees taken for resettlement in third
countries dwindled, the number seeking asylum increased." In Hong
Kong, the number of arrivals increased from 3,395 in 1987 to 18,446 in
1988.' In May of 1989, over 8,900 asylum-seekers arrived in Hong
Kong, pushing the total over 37,000.31 Common reasons for flight
included natural disaster, economic devastation, political oppression,
discrimination, and persecution."2 As in the past, asylum-seekers came
in unseaworthy, overcrowded boats. A relaxation of relations between
Vietnam and the People's Republic of China also heralded greater
numbers coming by land through China to Guangdong province, who then
made a relatively short trip to Hong Kong by boat.33

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 27-28.
25. INHuMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 8.
26. Id.
27. Helton, supra note 1, at 29.
28. INHuMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 8 (the United States had accepted for
resettlement most of those legally departing Vietnam).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.at 8-9.
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As a result, on June 16, 1988, Hong Kong initiated a screening
and detention policy that would permit those who arrived prior to a cutoff
date to be examined for purposes of determination of refugee status and
ultimate resettlement abroad, with those awaiting screening and those
screened out to be held pending return to Vietnam.'
V.

THE 1989 INDOCHINESE REFUGEE CONFERENCE:
A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION

On June 13-14, 1989, representatives of seventy-six governments
met at the International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in
Geneva."
The principal purpose of the conference was to endorse a
plan to deal with the continuing flight of Vietnamese asylum-seekers.'
Specifically, the governments sought to establish procedures to screen
asylum-seekers on a region-wide basis in order to determine which among
them deserve resettlement as refugees, and to organize the detention and
possible return, including deportation to Vietnam of those rejected after
37
screening.
The Comprehensive Plan of Action 8 (CPA) seeks to establish
in-country departure from Vietnam as "eventually the sole... [mode] of
departure." 39 The underlying assumption is that refugees will list
themselves with their government in order to enroll in an orderly
departure program.'
But those who fear persecution may flee from
their homeland, sometimes in an irregular and dangerous manner.4 This
human reality was not recognized in the Plan, nor was an unqualified
right of asylum in the receiving countries in the region. Generally, the
Southeast Asian countries have grudgingly provided "first" asylum, in
return for a promise of eventual resettlement abroad.42
34. Id. at 10.
35. International Conference, supra note 5, at 4.
36. id.at 1.
37. Id.at 2-3.
38. Id.at 11.
39. Id.at 12.
40. Id.
41. See UNIVERSALDECLARATIONOF HUMAN RIGHTS arts. 13(2), 14(1), G.A. Res.
217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948). The Declaration provided in pertinent part that
"[elveryone has the right to leave any country, including his own . . .[and] . . .the
right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." Id.
42. Helton, supra note 1, at 45.
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As to the treatment of new arrivals, the CPA provides that

"temporary refuge" will be given to asylum-seekers and that the UNHCR
will have "full and early access to new arrivals."43 Past experience in
the region, however, has belied such commitments.

Push-backs have

been periodic and, for example, access has not always been provided in
Thailand, particularly on the East coast, to officials of UNHCR."
The CPA sought to establish "a consistent region-wide refugee
status determination process."' But there have been prior problems in
the implementation of screening mechanisms in the region.' Thailand's
program to screen arriving Laotians has had a tradition of corruption and
concern with only prospects for resettlement abroad. 7 Asylum-seekers

with close family abroad are accepted in this screening procedure, while
others, including true refugees, are rejected.4 More recently, significant
problems have plagued the screening program in Hong Kong which from
the inception has been distorted by the application of improper criteria and

procedural defects.49 As of April 1989, only 3 of over 1300 Vietnamese

cases had been recognized by the Hong Kong authorities as entitled to
refugee status under international law.'

In terms of repatriation, the CPA calls for return to the country
of origin "in accordance with international practices reflecting the
responsibility of States toward citizens." 51 Although return in the first
43. InternationalConference, supra note 5, at 13.
44. Interview with U.N. officials in the branch office of UNHCR in Bangkok (May
1990). The information in this article may be considered sensitive by some government
or UNHCR officials, or others. Because it is neither practicable nor appropriate to clear
the content of the article with the sources of the information, the author has adopted a
convention of referring to the types of persons from which the information was obtained,
e.g., "officials," "diplomats," etc. The information is based on interviews conducted by
the author during visits to the region.
45. InternationalConference, supra note 5, at 13.
46.

LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FORCED BACK AND FORGOTTEN:

THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF LAOTIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THAILAND 26 (1989) [hereinafter
FORCED BACK AND FORGOTTEN].
47. Id. at 24.
48. id. at 21-29.
49. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF HONG
KONG AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF VIETNAMESE

ASYLUM SEEKERS IN HONG KONG 6 (1990) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL].
50. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 4. With regard to the background
on the introduction of screening in Hong Kong, see Mushkat, Refugee in Hong Kong,
1 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 449 (1989).
51. InternationalConference, supra note 5, at 15.
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instance should be "voluntary," forcible return is not precluded as it is
"recognized as being acceptable under international practices." 52 A
regional holding center under the auspices of the UNHCR
was offered for
53
consideration as an interim measure at the Conference.
VI.

THE ELEMENTS OF REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION

The emphasis on region-wide screening under the CPA
necessitates a discussion of the elements of refugee status determination.
In this connection, the subject of the inquiry, the asylum-seeker, is often
unacquainted with the legal system under which the inquiry is conducted,
and frequently must tell his or her story in a foreign language.
Consequently, the asylum-seeker's need for access to information and
adequate counsel can be critical. Additionally, adequate interpretation is
crucial .'
In more general terms, asylum-seekers often arrive with little or
no documentation supporting their claims for refugee protection.5 5
Adjudicators, therefore, must take into account this customary
characteristic in determination proceedings. Because issues of credibility
become paramount, cross-cultural differences must be considered. '
Generally, the adjudicator is to give the benefit of the doubt to the
asylum-seeker.57
In view of the inherent difficulties in refugee status determination,
examination by specialized adjudicators and an appeal or review is
generally considered necessary under international standards.5 8 Legal
assistance is often crucial to effective access to the adjudicatory
procedure. According to international principles, ambiguities should be
resolved in favor of the claimant asserting the need for refugee protection,
and, if necessary, any errors in determinations should be resolved in favor
of the recognition of refugees, even though perhaps unwarranted, as

52. Id.
53. Id.
54.

See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,

HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS

190, at 45 (1979) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
55. Id.
56. Id. para. 196, at 47.
57. Id. para. 190, at 45.
58. Id. para. 191.

para.
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opposed to their exclusion from protection."
The preparatory meeting for the International Conference on
Indochinese Refugees held at Kuala Lunpur from March 7-9, 1989,
established a Coordinating Committee under the chairmanship of UNHCR
to undertake the task of making arrangements for implementing the
The Coordinating Committee included a Subcommittee on
CPA.'
Reception and Status Determination, which met in Hong Kong on April
6-8, 1989.61 A regular review arrangement was contemplated to assess
progress in the implementation of the CPA and consider measures to
improve its effectiveness in meeting its objectives.62
The CPA foresees the introduction on a region-wide basis of a
"consistent, region-wide refugee status determination process to be
conducted in accordance with national legislation and internationally
accepted practice. " ' Consultations were undertaken by UNHCR with
concerned governments with a view toward establishing determination
procedures." These deliberations resulted in a Note reflecting several
Included was
basic principles relating to status determination.'
recognition that international criteria should govern status determinations,
the office of UNHCR should have ready access at all stages of the
procedure, and the authorities should cooperate with nongovernmental
organizations.'

A further Note on fair and efficient procedures was issued in 1990
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees in connection with
a judicial challenge brought in the Hong Kong High Court concerning
alleged unfairness in the screening and review procedure. 7 The
UNHCR described its monitoring role in the Hong Kong procedure as
59. Id. paras. 203-04, at 48.
60. International Conference, supra note 5, at 2.
61. Id.
62. Note on the Work of the Co-ordinating Committee for the International
Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doe.
AICONF.148/4 at 1-2 (1989) [hereinafter Co-ordinating Committee].
63. Id. at 3.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3, 17.
67. Note on the Role of UNHCR in the Hong Kong Procedure for Refugee Status
Determination (1990) (available at New York Law School Journalof Human Rights); see
infra note 195.
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involving counselling of asylum-seekers," monitoring of screening
interviews,' advice on general policy issues to the government, 70 and
legal assistance to deserving asylum-seekers who take appeals.71
Specifically, the UNHCR emphasized the following relevant requirements:
The applicant should receive the necessary guidance as to
the procedure to be followed. Given the vulnerable
situation of an asylum seeker in an alien environment, it
is important that he/she should on arrival receive
appropriate information on how to submit his/her
application.
Such advice is most effective on an
individual basis and is provided in many countries by
legal counselling services, funded by government,
UNHCR or non-governmental sources.
The applicant should be given the necessary facilities,
including the services of a competent interpreter for
submitting his case to the authorities concerned. This
requirement entails, first of all, that the applicant should
be given the opportunity to present his/her case as fully
as possible. As refugee status is primarily an evaluation
of the applicant's statement, the quality of interview is
crucial to a proper determination of the claim.
Paragraphs 196-205 of the Handbook deal with this
aspect of the procedure and make it clear that "while the
burden of proof in principle rests on the applicant, the
duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is
shared between the applicant and the examiner" and also
that the examiner should "ensure that the applicant
presents his case as fully as possible and with all
available evidence." The interviewer therefore has a
particular responsibility to ensure that the interview is
comprehensive and the records reflect accurately what
has been said. The reference to "necessary facilities"
could, in UNHCR's view, also include legal advice and
representation, if the applicant requires these in order to
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.para.
Id.para.
Id.para.
id.para.

4(a), at 2.
4(b).
4(c).
4(d).
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present his case properly.
If the applicant is not recognised, he should be given a
reasonable time to appeal for a formal reconsideration of
the decision, either to the same or different authority,
whether administrative or judicial, according to the
prevailing system." . . . Although this requirement is
phrased in general terms, in UNHCR's view the notion
of "appeal for a formal reconsideration" includes some
basic principles of fairness applicable equally to judicial
or administrative reviews, such as the possibility for the
applicant to be heard by the review body and to be able
to obtain legal advice and representation in order to make
his submission; for the reconsideration to be based on all
relevant evidence; and for a consistent and rational
application of refugee criteria in line with the guidelines
established in the UNHCR Handbook. UNHCR believes
that the notion of fairness also requires the review body
to provide the grounds for its decision, so that the
applicant can be re-assured that he has had a fair hearing
and the criteria have been applied properly.
The application should be examined by "qualified
personnel having the necessary knowledge and
experience, and an understanding of an applicant's
particular difficulties and needs." An understanding of
the application of refugee criteria as well as a knowledge
of the situation in the country of origin are necessary, in
particular, for assessing an applicant's credibility and the
well-foundedness of his fear of persecution.
The applicant should be granted the benefit of the doubt
if his statement is coherent and plausible and does not run
counter to generally known facts. Because of problems
of obtaining evidence to substantiate a refugee claim, and
the serious consequences which could result from an
erroneous decision, the evidential requirements should be
approached with flexibility. 7
72. Id. para. 9, at 4-5 (citations omitted); see supra note 54, in respect of
references to the UNHCR Handbook.
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REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION IN THE REGION

In determining whether general principles of refugee protection
are satisfied by a particular procedure, several factors must be considered,
including the training of adjudicators and interpreters; information about
relevant conditions in the country of origin; the role of counsel and
UNHCR; and the availability of judicial review. Recruitment and training
of adjudicators must be carried out according to sufficient standards.
Organizational arrangements and quality control measures, such as the use
of questionnaires and monitoring through file review and observation of
the proceedings should be present.
Given the humanitarian
responsibilities involved, the procedure must be insulated from law
enforcement and traditional immigration activities. The recruitment and
training of interpreters as well as adequate competency standards for
interpreters is crucial. The role of counsel, including the provision of
advice and counselling in respect of screening and review must also be
considered.
Additionally, due regard must be given to the arrangements
regarding administrative appeals, including the ability of individuals
and/or their counsel to be present during review consideration, and the
obligation, if any, of the reviewing authority to state reasons in connection
with negative decisions. The availability of judicial review must also be
considered, as well as the provision of legal assistance in that connection.
The use of the mandate of UNHCR to resettle initially rejected refugees
may also be a potential safeguard in a status determination procedure.
A review of current practices in the region will determine whether
the principles discussed above are being followed under the CPA.
A.

Indonesia

In Indonesia, screening is on-going after an initial phase in which
refugee criteria were misapplied by the authorities. '
According to
UNHCR officials, after a "disastrous" beginning, screening is proceeding
as contemplated under the CPA.' 4 In the first phase of screening,
resettlement criteria were applied to the cases."5 Boat people had their
claims approved based on whether they fit profiles of those cases that
would likely receive offers of resettlement abroad, including prior ties to

73. Interview with UNHCR officials in Jakarta (May 1990).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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those countries in the nature of family or employment.76 In the second
phase, standard refugee status criteria were applied.77 No decisions are
to be announced regarding cases decided in the first phase until they have
been reviewed under standard criteria; 780 cases were reviewed in phase
one and 340 cases in phase two. 8 The Indonesian authorities have
maintained temporary refuge for Vietnamese boat people" in the face of
relatively high levels of arrivals which is caused, in large part, by
Malaysia's policy of redirecting boats to Indonesia. I
The military personnel involved in the screening procedure in
Indonesia are considered competent.8 " The essential problem is posed
by the continuing high level of arrivals which has caused the camp
population at Galang to increase from 2,000 to 12,000 over the first half
of 1990.1 It is estimated that by the fall of 1990, there will be 20,000
inhabitants at the Galang Island refugee camp.' Only 600 out of this
total would be those that arrived prior to the cutoff date under the CPA,
and most of those individuals have already been claimed by countries of
resettlement." According to the UNHCR, in April of 1990, there were
1,189 arrivals of Vietnamese boat people.8" In Galang, 10,641 asylumseekers are being held, and 1,115 cases were pending screening.'
UNHCR personnel interview asylum-seekers prior to their contact
with the Indonesian authorities. 7 Biographical data are developed as
well as an initial assessment of the claim for refugee protection. These
materials are not given to the Indonesian authorities.8 9 The P3V
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Temporary stay may be denied by Indonesia to Cambodians who express a wish
to go to Australia. See generally UN Powers Set to Meet on Cambodia Peace Plan,
South China Morning Post, May 17, 1990, at 14, col. 6.
80. Interview with U.S. officials at the United States Embassy in Jakarta (May
1990).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. ld.
85. Interview with UNHCR officials in Indonesia (May 1990).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. ld.
89. Id.
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Committee, the screening entity, is composed two-thirds of high ranking
military officers.' The P3V Committee conducts the main interview and
makes decisions after consulting with UNHCR.91 When the assessments
of the P3V Committee and UNHCR conflict, discussions between the
interviewers and consultants are possible with a view toward
resolution.'
The UNHCR has seven legal consultants and seven
interpreters.' The interpreters used by the authorities are considered to
be competent.9
The P3V Committee conducts seven interviews per day with a
corps of rotating officers." Interviews range from two to two-and-a-half
hours in length, and follow interviews by the UNHCR personnel of oneand-a-half hours.' The UNHCR estimates that, assuming a rate of 250
individuals screened per month, screening of the population currently at
Galang would require four years if there are no additional arrivals. '
According to UNHCR, there is no legal tradition in Indonesia
which would support judicial review by asylum-seekers rejected in the
procedure."
B.

Malaysia

Screening in Malaysia has advanced to the point where of the first
group of decisions announced in May of 1990, there was an approval rate
of thirty-six percent, after factoring in family unity cases.' The first set
of decisions announced in Malaysia involved the approval of 62 cases
(121 individuals) and the rejection of 111 cases (173 individuals)." ° As
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. ld.
99. Interview with UNHCR officials in Kuala Lumpur (May 1990).
The
Comprehensive Plan of Action recognizes "the need to respect the family unit" in
refugee status determination. InternationalConference, supra note 5, at 13 (in practice,
this means that asylum-seekers should be accorded refugee status if they can show that
they are immediate family of previously recognized refugees).
100. Id.
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of July 31, 1990, the totals are as follows:1. 1

Number interviewed
Positive decisions
Negative decisions
Positive review (appeal)
Negative review

eopl

Cases

2,533
591
1,025
18
42

1,429
291
677
6
34

According to UNHCR officials, screening is conducted by a
governmental task force that includes navy, police, civilians and army
officers, known as Task Force VII. 1 °2 A lengthy questionnaire is
used."°
On any given day, there are six officials interviewing°4
Vietnamese boat people at the rate of eighteen cases per day)
Because the interview in Malaysia operates as a joint exercise between
UNHCR and the Malaysian authorities, the UNHCR provides its case
assessment to the authorities. 0" Interpreters are available to either the
UNHCR or government interviewers, and a contract was recently
undertaken with the United States-based International Rescue Committee
to recruit six foreign interpreters for the interviews.'
There are seven
7
UNHCR legal consultants in Malaysia.
The director of Task Force
VII generally will not interview without UNHCR being present."° As
the interviews are collective, there are ordinarily no problems regarding
discrepancies. UNHCR consultants are also available to the boat people
after arrival, prior to the initial interview and before and after first
instance decisions are given. 9 Diplomats have estimated that it could
require up to four years to screen the inhabitants at Pilau Bidong." 0
In terms of review procedures, a Refugee Status Review Board
(RSRB) has been established composed of government officials at a senior
101. UNHCR Statistics on Refugee Status Determination under the CPA (July 20,
1990) [hereinafter UNHCR Statistics].
102. Interview with UNHCR officials in Kuala Lumpur, supra note 99.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Interview with U.S. officials in Kuala Lumpur (May 1990).
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level and different from those who conduct interviews and make first
instance decisions. The UNHCR is a member of the RSRB in an observer
and advisory capacity. The board is chaired by the director of the
national Task Force and sits in three-member panels. Boat people have
seven days in which to file a formal notice of intent to seek review, and
thirty days thereafter to prepare the grounds on which review is being
sought. A Review Advice Group has been organized from among
asylum-seekers consisting of boat people who have undertaken university
studies in various fields, including law. Currently six asylum-seekers in
Pilau Bidong camp have been identified as legal resources to assist boat
people in presenting their appeals. Legal advice through a separate
agency is not available to assist boat people wishing to appeal. No
reasons are provided in connection with negative decisions on appeal,
although a proposal to the authorities in that regard has been made."'
The first session of the RSRB took place on July 30, 1990."' There is

no provision for judicial review.
C.

Thailand

In April of 1990, 932 boat people arrived in Thailand;"13 1,742
arrived in May. 1 4 In July of 1990, only about 650 boat people
arrived.' 5
Arriving Vietnamese in Thailand are considered according to Thai
government documents to be "illegal immigrants" to whom officials "who
do not have any duty involved" have no "access."16 Arrivals are to be

transferred within fifteen days to Section S in Phanat Nikhom camp,
where they are detained prior to screening." 7 At this juncture,
according to the Thai documents, "UNHCR shall have access in order to
prepare [the] UNHCR form after notifying [the] Camp Commander each
111. Interview with UNHCR Officials in Kuala Lumpur, supra note 99.
112. Id.
113.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONO, MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT (ARRIVALS

Doe. No. SRD 704/1/1, Form V (1990).
114. Id.
115. Telephone interview with UNHCR official in Bangkok (Aug. 1990). In
August, 500 Vietnamese arrived by boat and 50 by land, making for a total of 7,368
arrivals between January and August. Id.
116. See generally Helton, supra note 1, at 32-38.
117. Id. at 27-28.
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and every time."11 e Those individuals whose cases are actually under
consideration are transferred to a designated place, currently Section 0 at
Phanat Nikhom. n" 9
A new transit center in Nakhon Ratchasima
Province is scheduled to open in September for Vietnamese boat people
who have not been accorded status and who are awaiting return. 'I The
center will accommodate about one-thousand boat people, and will be
established at the remote Si Khiu Camp on the site of an earlier detention
center for Vietnamese which had been closed in 1986.121
The Screening Committee responsible for status determination is
chaired by the Deputy Director of the Operations Centre for Displaced
Persons (OCDP) in Bangkok, and includes the Assistant Director of
OCDP, the Chiefs of the Foreign Affairs and Border Information Unit,
Planning Division, Coordination with International Organizations,
Budgetary Division and Operation Division of the Ministry of the Interior
(MOI). 11 Committee determinations are forwarded to the director of
OCDP for approval and are based on preliminary interviews which are
conducted by teams of MOI officers who are assisted by interpreters." 5
A standard questionnaire is utilized."
UNHCR participates as an
"observer" during Screening Committee deliberations. 5
New interviewers were added to the process in April of 1990, by
the Thai authorities and are to be trained in July." At any one time,
seven interviewers are working, drawn from a pool of thirty-five to forty
MOI officials."
New members of the pool of interviewers must be
trained as they are added to the process." 5
At the beginning, UNHCR had the capacity to sit in on all of the
interviews.' 29 Now, less than forty percent are monitored, including

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Interview with UNHCR officials in Bangkok, supra note 115.
UNHCR Center in Nakhon Ratchasita Planned, Bangkok Voice of Free Asia,

July 18, 1990.
122. Interview with UNHCR officials in Bangkok, supra note 115.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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some without interpreters."' In the UNHCR office, there are four legal
consultants, including three local lawyers, who are assisted by three
interpreters.131 Comprehensive monitoring at the outset was considered
to have helped enhance interpretation in the screening process. An
interpreter training seminar was held by the UNHCR branch office in
June of 1990, which could provide a useful model to the region and
elsewhere.' 32
In the status determination procedure, the Thai authorities have
first contact with the applicant. 133 The interviewers are generally
receptive to discussing marginal cases with UNHCR monitors prior to
formal consideration at the Committee meeting. 3
While screening began slowly in Thailand, it has progressed with
an approval rate about twenty percent, including those affected by family
unity cases. 135 Through July of 1990, 58 individuals (38 cases) have
been approved and 248 (188 cases) have been rejected by the Screening
of 123 individuals (87
Committee." Appeals had been filed on behalf
137
cases) of which UNHCR supported 6 (5 cases).
According to UNHCR officials, there is a danger that the Thai
interviewers will be restrictive in their application of refugee criteria,
presumably to avoid being left with a residue of boat people who are
rejected by the countries of resettlement. 3 United States immigration
authorities have just begun to interview screened-in Vietnamese in
Thailand for purposes of resettlement abroad. 139

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The interviews by U.S. Joint Voluntary Agency (JVA) personnel raise the socalled "double screening" issue. Will the countries of resettlement re-determine the
question of refugee status and reject cases already accepted under the screening and
review procedure established under the Comprehensive Plan of Action? In the United
States, the Refugee Act of 1980 vests the discretion respecting admission in the Attorney
General, as delegated to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See 8 U.S.C. §
1157 (1988). Differential treatment by the countries of resettlement could be a source
of friction between themselves and the countries of first asylum.
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Those boat people denied by the Screening Committee are given
written notices and advised that appeals may be taken through UNHCR
within seven days of a Committee determination with the opportunity
within thirty days to submit additional information for
reconsideration.1 0 An inter-agency Appeals Committee in Bangkok is
chaired by the Deputy Permanent Secretary of MOI and includes the
Deputy Director and Assistant Deputy Director of OCDP, as well as
representatives of the National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Joint Operations Command, Navy, Immigration and Marine
Police. 1
UNHCR has considerable responsibility on appeals. Indeed, the
Thai are of the view that only those appeals considered by UNHCR will
have a chance of recognition on appeal."
As July 1990, UNHCR had
supported only five of a total of eighty-seven cases on appeal.143
Those Vietnamese who are "screened in" are given a written
notice, transferred to Section C, and registered awaiting resettlement. 1 "
UNHCR is informed of the positive determination in order that it may
begin making appropriate arrangements. 14
According to Thai
government documents, under the CPA, Vietnamese refugees "have no
right to choose the country for resettlement.""
Those asylum-seekers
who are "screened out" are also segregated pending being returned to
Vietnam. 4 Absent specific authority, the Thai provide no access to
these individuals. 45
There is no provision for judicial review in
Thailand for cases denied under this procedure.149
D.

Philippines

The Philippines is the only country among those discussed in this
article that has signed the United Nations Convention and Protocol
140. See Co-ordinating Committee, supra note 62, at 9.
141. Interview with UNHCR officials in Bangkok (May 1990).
142. Interview with Charoen Wimuttikosol, Assistant Director, Operations Centre
for Displaced Persons, Thailand Ministry of Interior, in Bangkok (May 23, 1990).
143. See Interview with UNHCR officials in Bangkok, supra note 115.
144. See Helton, supra note 1, at 31.
145. Displaced Persons Report, supra note 15, at 5.
146. Id.
147. See Interview with Charoen Wimuttikosol, supra note 142.
148. See Interview with UNHCR officials in Bangkok, supra note 115.
149. Id.
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relating to the Status of Refugees."
The procedure for the
determination of refugee status in the Philippines involves three stages:
reception, status determination, and appeal."'
Upon arrival in the Philippines, an initial registration is conducted
by local officials. 152 Asylum-seekers are then transferred to the
Philippine First Asylum Camp (PFAC) in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. 53
As of June. 30, 1990, 8,095 asylum-seekers were held in the PFAC, and
6,991 of them had arrived after March 21, 1989." s Asylum-seekers are
interviewed by non-governmental organization staff under the supervision
of UNHCR in the PFAC. 55 Standardized questionnaires are used. 1m
Reports of the pre-determination interviews are signed by asylum-seekers
and presented to the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
for decision."'
A decision on refugee status is made by a CID official, who is
present at the camp and to whom the pre-determination interview report
is submitted."' s In doubtful cases, including those where a negative
decision is foreseen, the asylum-seeker, assisted by an interpreter, is to
be present so that the deciding officer can ask follow-up questions and
make an assessment of credibility. 59
' A UNHCR representative is to
observe interviews, but is not permitted to participate in the
proceedings."
Decisions on refugee status are made in Manila and are
to be communicated to applicants in writing and a copy is given to
UNHCR."' In the case of a negative decision, the basis for the denial
is to be stated and an asylum-seeker given fifteen days to file a notice of
150. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Status of
Accessions to andRatifications ofMultilateralTreaties ConcerningRefugees, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.96/INF. 172/Rev.2 (1989).
151. F. Feliciano & M. Cerna, Refugees in Southeast Asia: A Note on Philippine
Practice and Recent Developments 3 n.1 (Aug. 10, 1990) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at New York Law School Journalof Human Rights).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2, 4.
155. Id. at 3 n.1.
156. Id. at 4 n.1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 5 n.1.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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appeal. 2 If no appeal is taken, "the asylum seeker shall be deemed to
have chosen voluntary repatriation."'6
As of June 1990, 774
individuals had been screened and were awaiting decisions," 18
individuals (12 cases) had been granted refugee status, and 17 individuals
(10 cases) had been denied status, in the first instance. 5
Appeals are to be submitted to an Interagency Task Force on
Refugee Assistance and Administration sitting as an appeal board in
Manila."
The asylum-seeker is given an opportunity to submit a
written statement in support of the appeal, 67 and UNHCR has seven
days from receipt of the notice or statement to submit its comment on the
appeal "

A copy of the decision of the Appeal Board is given to

UNHCR, and a representative of UNHCR is to serve a copy on the
individual. " The decisions of the Appeal Board are considered
"final."" 7 As of June 1990, 17 individuals (10 cases) had been rejected
71
on appeal.
Rescue-at-sea cases have posed a particular dilemma in the
Philippines, which is the only country in the region that still accepts such
cases subsequent to the promulgation of the CPA."
In dealing with the rescue-at-sea cases, the
Philippine Government has adopted the procedure that
before any such case will be admitted in any of the
refugee centers in the country, a written guaranty should
be given by the flag state of the rescuing vessel to the
effect that the people rescued will be transferred from the
Philippines by 31 December 1992 regardless of their
status as refugees or non-refugees, under the
responsibility of such flag state. Two specific instances
may be referred to in this connection
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.at 6 n.1.
Id.at 7 n.1.
See UNHCR Statistics, supra note 101, at
Id.
F. Feliciano & M. Cerna, supra note 151,
Id.
Id.at 7 n.1.
Id.
Id.
See UNHCR Statistics, supra note 101, at
F. Feliciano & M. Cerna, supra note 151,

1.
at 6 n.1.

1.
at 19.
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The first is the case of the USS Beaufort. On 30
May 1990, the USS Beaufort docked at the Subic Naval
Base, Olongapo, Philippines, with 101 Vietnamese boat
people who had been rescued in the South China Sea on
17-18 May 1990. The Embassy of the United States, in
its Notes Nos. 412 and 413, both dated 29 May 1990,
requested the Philippine Government to authorize the
disembarkation of the rescued boat people and stated that
the United States "guarantees the resettlement of all
Vietnamese boat people brought to the Philippines by the
USS Beaufort."
The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs
sought a more specific guarantee from the United States
Government that the boat people brought in by the USS
Beaufort will be transferred from the Philippines by 31
December 1992, regardless of whether they are
determined to be refugees or not. Meantime, a second
group composed of 154 Vietnamese boat people rescued
at sea by the USS Pelelieu in the same area where the
101 boat people had been found, arrived at the Subic
Naval Base on 13 June 1990. This brought to 255 the
total number of boat people rescued at sea by the two
United States warships. After consultations with the
United States and the UNHCR, the Philippine
Government, for humanitarian reasons, permitted the
disembarkation of the 255 boat people upon the
assurances of the UNHCR that they will be removed from
the country by 31 December 1992.
The second illustrative case involved a Canadian
warship visiting Manila, the HMCS Provider, which on
22 June 1990 brought to the Philippines 90 Vietnamese
boat people rescued at sea. The Canadian Embassy in its
Note No. 125-90, dated 20 June 1990, requested the
Department of Foreign Affairs to authorize the
disembarkation of the boat people on board the warship.
Upon request of the Department of Foreign Affairs for a
guarantee of transfer, the Canadian Embassy, by its Note
No. 135-90, dated 23 June 1990, extended the assurance
requested by the Philippine Government that an equal

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VIII

number of boat people will be transferred from the
Philippines by 31 December 1992 whether or not they are
determined to be "refugees."
On the basis of this
assurance, the Department of Foreign Affairs authorized
the immediate disembarkation of the boat people on board
the HMCS Provider.17
E.

Hong Kong

Upon interception in Hong Kong waters, asylum-seekers are
informed that they are illegally entering the territory.1 74 If they insist
on remaining, a screening procedure is to be carried out in accordance
1 76
17
with the strictures of the 1951 Convention ' and 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees and the UNHCR Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under a Statement
of Understanding between the UNHCR and Hong Kong authorities.1"
The UNHCR is the exclusive source of legal advice and assistance to
asylum-seekers in the screening and review procedures,
and is to have
1 78
unrestricted access to the Vietnamese for this purpose.
Interviews are conducted by an Immigration Department officer,
who is assisted by an interpreter' 79
The officer completes a
questionnaire and makes a recommendation on the case, including an
assessment of credibility." ° Legal counsellors of the UNHCR have
unrestricted access in order to be able to monitor the screening
interview.8 1
The interviewer's recommendation is reviewed by
superiors, who make the final decision."* If the final decision is
negative, the applicant is informed of the denial and of the right to
appeal.' " At the time of notification of the denial, a copy of the

173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 20-21 (emphasis in original).
See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 20.
Id.
Id.

177. Id.
178. Interview with Michael Hansen, Refugee Coordinator, Security Branch, in
Hong Kong (May 24, 1990); see also INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 20-21.
179. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 20.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 22.
182. Id. at 20.
183. Id.
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Immigration Department file is given to UNHCR and a legal consultant
at the Agency for Volunteer Service so that they may consider assisting
asylum-seekers with a review.'" An objection must be lodged with the
Immigration Department within fourteen days of notice of the
termination." Within four to six weeks, a written statement must be
submitted by the applicant for review. 1m
On May 31, 1989, legislation was enacted to establish four panels
of a Refugee Status Review Board (RSRB) to handle cases that otherwise
would be heard by the Governor in Council."' The RSRB is headed by
a former judge and is organized in two-person panels whose members are
drawn from the civil service and the community at large. 8 A positive
decision by one panel member suffices to overturn a negative screening
decision."' While legal assistance may be offered to some applicants
in preparing cases for review, no legal representation is permitted at the
review itself.1" Oral evidence is not given at the review board,
although some asylum-seekers are re-interviewed by board members,
some of which are monitored by UNHCR. 191
As of July 1, 1990, the Director of Immigration had completed
screening for 14,386 people, of whom 1,611 were screened in (11.2%),
including on family unity grounds, and 12,775 were screened out
(88.8%).'" The RSRB has reviewed the cases of 10,440 people.'"
The Director of Immigration's decision has been upheld for 9,539 people
and overturned for 901.194
The screening procedure in Hong Kong has been very
controversial. Worthy cases have been reported rejected, including
Vietnamese who had been subjected to harsh re-education and forced
184. Id. at 22.

185. Id. at 20.
186. id.
187. id. at 21.
188. AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL,

supra note 49, at 11.

189. Id.
190. Id. at 10-11.
191. Interview with UNHCR officials in Hong Kong (May 1990).

192. GOvERNmENT OF HONO KONO FACT SHEET: VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN
HONO KONO (July 1990).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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labor measures.195 Amnesty International has criticized the procedure
as having "critical flaws" and made recommendations to enhance the
procedure, including the provision of more systematic legal counselling
and requiring the RSRB to state reasons for negative decisions on
appeal. 19
Perhaps the most eloquent criticism is that offered by different
asylum-seekers themselves:
Our family arrived in Hong Kong on April 25,
1989, after a long and dangerous journey. We were
interviewed in August of the same year. The interview
was very brief and I was not allowed enough time to
elaborate on the persecutions that we underwent in
Vietnam. The interviewing officer said that there would
be another interview. We waited for that other interview
but, after a month, received notice from the Immigration
office of our being denied refugee status.
I then saw a lawyer to submit our request for
appeal. The lawyer received me for only 30 minutes,
asked me a few superficial questions, handed out a form
for me to fill on my own, and left in a rush to tend to
(his/her) personal affairs. I knew we were doomed. I
spent many sleepless nights worrying about my family's
fate. Within days, I lost weight and grew old beyond
recognition.
In December 1989, I received notice of the
rejection of my appeal. I slumped into depression, lying
in my bunk all day long, thinking of my family: this is
the end of our lives. Nothing is left after a death
sentence. 197
195. See Basler, Boat People to Fight Hong Kong in Court, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25,
1990, at A3, col. 4; see also Basler, Hong Kong Facing Refugee Lawsuit, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 18, 1990, at All, col. 1 [hereinafter Refugee Lawsuit]. On February 18, 1991, a
judge of the Hong Kong High Court ruled that a Vietnamese boat person was entitled
to new administrative proceedings in view of error in the screening and review
procedures in his case. Basler, Hong Kong CourtRules on a Refugee, N.Y. Times, Feb.
19, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
196. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 49, at 51-52.
197. Letters from Vietnamese asylum-seekersto either Refugees International or the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1990) [hereinafter Letters from Vietnamese
asylum-seekers in 1990] (discussing problems and urging help with the screening process
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At last we fulfilled our wish and escaped to Hong
Kong, only to encounter the "screening" process. We
are desperately waiting for the judgement of the Hong
Kong government and the monitor of the United Nations.
But the policy of the screening process is unfair and
unjust.
When Immigration officers interviewed us the
first time, they forced us to answer certain chosen
questions as "yes" or "no." They did not give us any
opportunity to tell our background and the harrassment
[sic] we received from the Communists.
The
Immigration officers even forced my mother not to say
that. She has a brother at the Sam Yick Camp, Hong
Kong. Our interview was one-sided and intentionally
manipulated to fit our status into the so-called "economic
migrant" category. Therefore we were denied status as
political refugees. 1

I have not been satisfied with the unfair decisions
of [the] Hong Kong Immigration Department and Refugee
Status Review Board. My argument [is] as following:
1.
The reasons that [the] Immigration
Officer cited . . . [are] not sound. He has used the
words of my frightened younger brother to reject my
claims.
2.
The Immigration officer did not
understand fully what I declared, maybe because of the
difficulties in languages. I was questioned and answered
through an Interpreter who was not. . .[proficient] in
modern Vietnamese and in his job.

at the Whitehead detention facility). Translations are not literal and authors' names have
been omitted due to the sensitive nature of the information disclosed and to prevent any
possibility of retaliation.
198. Id.
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3.
The Immigration [officer exhibited] ...
some threatened behaviours to my younger brother and
my husband ... who were accustom[ed] to be threatened
by Vietnamese Communist police, so they ... [found it]
difficult to tell all the truth."9

With limited knowledge, old age, plus the fear of
being return to Vietnam, I was not prepared to remember
all the details of my past for the immigration officials.
And after the long period in detention in the prison-like
camp with unguaranteed security reduced my memory
and the quickness necessary to answer the immigration
officers' questions. I completely lost self control.
When I had to explain that my life was oppressed
and repressed by the Communists in Vietnam within a
time limit of little more than one hour, I could not
concretely explain everything.
As a result, the
Immigration Office did not believe and did not accept me
as a refugee.
Representing the Immigration Office: Mr Hai
Sao had a polite attitude, different than the cold and
severe attitude of the Vietnamese Communist police, but
my conversation had to be done through a translator
therefore it became much more difficult. When I was
asked the time of the events or my viewpoints, the
translator appeared to be irritated and hurried to finish
the job. Therefore I could not explain everything clearly,
or I could only speak shortly. If I tried to elaborate, I
was cut short without being able to explain things.
For example, Mr. Hai Sao asked which religion
my family and I observe. I answered, Buddhist. And
the question that followed was do we worship our
ancestors.
Because all Vietnamese worship their
ancestors, regardless of religion, therefore I answered
'yes'. After that I was not asked about the oppression of
Buddhism in Vietnam. I was ordered to follow the

199. Id.
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Immigration Office questions."

After arriving at Hong Kong, I had met with
some Immigration officers. The meeting did not allow
me enough time to tell my story and my reasons for
leaving Vietnam. After that, I met with a lawyer to
prepare the paper work requesting consideration for
refugee status. Again, I was neither given a chance to
talk, nor did I fill out any application. He only took
some papers and said that he would meet with me again
two days later. I did not hear from him again since then.
In the mean time, I received a second refusal for refugee
status. 1

At the same time the Hong Kong Government
carries out the screening policy, the main purpose of
which is to take away our hope and our refugee status.
The major aim of this policy is not to select the real
refugee but to stop the flow of refugees. Therefore,
before we have any interview concerning our status, we
were never ... [given] any legal advice from the Hong
Kong Government, The UNHCR or any human rights
group to prepare ourselves for the interview. On the
other hand, the Hong Kong immigration office use[s]
fixed questions in the screening process. They used
intimidating behavior such as: yelling at us, pushing their
hands on the table, examining our bodies, forcing us to
put our hands on the table and not giving us permission
to tell our full stories.
The officer for the second screening interview
had also simplified the problem. There are people who
were denied refugee status within the twenty-eight given
days for appeal or before they have a chance to see the
lawyers. Most people do not know the face of the
200. Id.
201. Id.
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officers of the second interview. Twice our refugee
status was denied us and we were not told the reason
why. The Hong Kong Government way of doing things
show that they want to label us as economic refugees and
force us to go back. As . . . [a] result, in January and

February 1990 because of being rejected from receiving
refugee status one woman and eleven men cut open their
stomachs to protest against the screening policy and to
prove that they are willing to die [rather] than to go back
to Vietnam. One man hanged himself.'

On the February 16, 1989 I and my niece,
Nguyen Thi Diem, born in 1979, had an interview with
Hong Kong Immigration Office. During the interview,
an official gave us very rude treatments such as:
searching our bodies, yelling at us, slamming on the
table, pointing a ruler at our faces, forcing us to face
against the wall, etc. I was very upset, confused and
terrified because of those treatments. Therefore, I did
not understand and answer his questions as clearly as I
should.'
VIII.

THE APPLICATION OF

A.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND REFUGEE LAW

Push-backs: Malaysia

No precept of law is more fundamental than the principle of nonrefoulement, which prohibits the return of a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to a place where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened.' In 1977, the governments of the Executive Committee of
the UNHCR Programme concluded that the principle of non-refoulement
applies to persons at a state's border, whether or not they have been
formally recognized as refugees.' The Executive Committee reiterated
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Helton, supra note 1, at 39 (quoting G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUoEE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983)).
205. Id. at 40 n.119.
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this fundamental protection precept in 1981 when it concluded that in
situations of influx, asylum-seekers should be admitted to the state in
which they seek refuge at least on a temporary basis, and that in all cases
the principle of non-rejection at the frontier must be scrupulously
observed.'
In Malaysia, the greatest threat to refugee protection is the
continued redirection policy, which, as of May of 1990, had affected
almost 8,000 Vietnamese boat people.'
According to United States
diplomats, the policy has also resulted in nine confirmed deaths.'
As
a result of the redirection policy, arrivals in May of 1990 numbered only
27, compared to the 1,730 boat people that arrived in Malaysia in May
of 19 8 9 .m United States diplomats characterize the dialogue with
Malaysian officials on the question of the return of screened-out boat
people as "sterile."21 0 The UNHCR interviews boat leaders in Indonesia
regarding "redirections." Ordinarily, boat people are held in camps in the
forests of Malaysia by officials who seek to remain unaccountable for
their actions by placing tape over their name-plates.21 ' The Malaysian
authorities sometimes give the asylum-seekers boats, life-jackets
(particularly to women and children), a compass, and maps.2 2 The
boat people are then redirected to Indonesia.2 13
Malaysia's policy and practice of rejecting Vietnamese boat
people prior to screening contravenes the basic principle of nonrefoulement and should be ended forthwith. According to western
diplomats, the Malaysian redirection policy has been formulated in the
Prime Minister's office and is estimated to be relatively quite expensive,
reflecting the high governmental level of authorization involved. 214
Providing the Vietnamese boat people with new boats costs upwards of

206. Id. (conclusions of the Executive Committee are so-called "soft law" sources
that can serve as evidence of state practice or sources to interpret accepted legal
obligations).
207. Interview with U.S. consular official in Hong Kong (May 1990).
208. Id. Undoubtedly, more than nine refugees have perished as a result of this
policy.
209. Id.
210. Interview with U.S. officials in Kuala Lumpur (May 1990).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Interview with UNHCR officials in Indonesia, supra note 85.
214. Interview with Western diplomats in Kuala Lumpur (May 1990).
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$20,000.215 Additional costs include fuel, life-jackets and other essential
provisions. 216
B.

Detention
1.

Hong Kong

Camps in Hong Kong, where about 50,000 Vietnamese are
currently being held, are in many instances horrendously overcrowded,
terribly inadequate, or both.2"' The inhabitants continue to face
considerable violence in the camps, perhaps an inevitable consequence of
a brutal detention policy."1 As one detainee in Hong Kong described
the situation:
Nevertheless, the Hong Kong Government has
ignored the 1951 Geneva ... [Convention] and the 1967
Protocol concerning the refugees. They have wrongly
held us in these horrible detention centers, similar to the
Fascist concentration camps. In this closed camp we live
like primitive man. The "family" concept has been
destroyed because more than 100 people are forced to
live in a small hut of 90 meters. We do not have enough
air. We have diseases and sickness, but medical service
have been very meager. There is not enough space nor
furniture for schooling. Our children have learned
almost nothing for the past two years. Furthermore, the
Hong Kong Government has encouraged division among
the Vietnamese boat people by giving support to the
criminal elements in the camps. The criminals continue
to stir up trouble among the boat people which then
lowers our dignity in the eyes of the community.2 19

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 12; see also Erlanger, Far
Fewer Boat People Coming to Hong Kong, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1991, at AS, col. 1.
218. Id. at 14.
219. Letters from Vietnamese asylum-seekers in 1990, supra note 197.
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2.

Malaysia

As of August 1990, 14,000 Vietnamese were being held at Pilau
Bidong in Malaysia.'
The camp has deteriorated greatly because of
overcrowding and the inability to obtain permission from the local
authorities to effect an expansion. " Specifically, the houses at Bidong
were designed for an occupancy rate of about six to eight persons per
living unit.'
In September of 1989, the occupancy rate in some living
units was twenty-five people.'
The foundations of many of the houses
have been eroded by inhabitants digging underneath in an attempt to
create more living space.'
The danger of collapse is ever-present.
Also, unsanitary conditions have been created by a severe shortage of
toilets and inadequate sewer lines.'
The Malaysian Red Crescent
Society, the only non-governmental service provider sanctioned by the
Malaysian authorities, is experiencing a funding crisis due, in part, to
UNHCR's own funding difficulties.'
3.

Thailand

In Thailand, the situation in Phanat Nikhom camp is particularly
difficult for Vietnamese asylum-seekers. As of August 1990, there were
about 8,000 in section S awaiting screening, and about 1,000 in section
0 awaiting decisions relating to screening to which their cases have been
subjected. 7 There is overcrowding, with up to forty persons in each
building in section S, which was built to house twenty-five.2
Thai
authorities have stated that educational activities might be provided to
children after the newly contemplated Si Khiu camp was opened to
accommodate those who had been screened out.'
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
Bidong.
226.
(May 17,
227.
228.
229.

MALAYSIAN RED CRESCENT SOCIETY, 3RD QUARTERLY REPORT 11 (1989).

Id.
Id.
Id. The occupancy rate in living units is probably even greater now.
Id.
Id. There is approximately one toilet per 150 people in the camp at Pilau
Interview with Datin Paduka Ruby Lee of the Malaysian Red Crescent Society
1990).
Interview with UNHCR officials in Thailand (May 1990).
Id.
Interview with Charoen Wimuttikosol, supra note 142.
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Analysis and Recommendations

The detention policy countenanced for Vietnamese boat people in
the region is not only inhumane, it violates accepted tenets of international
law. Article 9(1) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'
prohibits arbitrary detention -- such as that of the Vietnamese -- which

has no legitimate purpose related either to eventual removal or
considerations of national security. 1 The prohibition against prolonged
arbitrary detention has achieved the character of customary international
law and is binding on nations irrespective of accession to this treaty
provision. 2 The detention policy should be immediately curtailed to
the extent it violates these basic precepts.
C.

Screening

A screening procedure that does not accurately determine refugee
status runs a risk of returning refugees who fear persecution in violation
of Article 33 of the Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees. 3 Article 33 states:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion.'
A "refugee" is defined as one who has a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion" and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of the country of origin."
230. G.A. Res. 2200, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 170, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
231. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 49, at 3.
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREION RELATIONS § 702(e) (1986).
233. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 33, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 6259, T.I.A.S. No. 6557, at 37, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 176 [hereinafter
Convention]; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 6224, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 2, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
234. Convention, supra note 233, 19 U.S.T. at 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 54,
189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
235. id. at 6261, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, at 39, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.

1990]

REFUGEE PROTECTION

The principle of non-refoulement is now considered a norm of customary
international law binding even on those states which are not parties to the
refugee treaties.'
1.

Hong Kong

The initial refugee screening procedure that Hong Kong has used
since June, 1988, has been criticized as cursory and filled with potential
for error."7 Interviewers seemed intent on establishing solely economic
reasons for departure from Vietnam. Asylum-seekers who have endured
harsh re-education programs or forced labor in Vietnam have been
routinely rejected. 8 As the letters from asylum-seekers show, they are
unable to fully explain their claims for asylum.' Frequently, they have
no meaningful way to check disputed facts or to correct translation errors.
Poor translation facilities and inadequate records then obstruct
appeals.m°
The screening and review procedures have been the subject of
recent improvement, most particularly a recent decision of the Hong Kong
authorities to provide particularized reasons to support negative decisions
of the Refugee Status Review Board."4
This important procedural
safeguard has yet to be emulated elsewhere in the region. After
considerable delay, reasoned decisions began being rendered in the latter
half of 1990.2 Also, Review Board members have reinterviewed many
of the boat people who had sought review of negative decisions in the first
instance.'
Appeals are taken in about one third of the cases by
lawyers with the Agency for Voluntary Service, expanding somewhat the
resources available to boat people at that relatively late stage of the
236. Helton, supra note 1, at 40 & nn.119-20 (citing UNHCR Conclusions on the
International Protection of Refugees adopted by the Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme 14 (1980); G. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUoEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1983)).
237. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 49, at 4.

238. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 31.
239. Id. at 32.
240. Id.
241. See generally Griffin, Legal Counselfor Boat People, South China Morning
Post, May 27, 1990, at 2, col. 1; see also Interview with UNHCR officials in Hong
Kong (May 1990).
242. Interview with UNHCR officials in Geneva (Oct. 1990).
243. ld.
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processing system.24
The unavailability of individualized legal
counselling prior to first instance screening, however, continues to be a
serious flaw in the procedure.'
UNHCR monitoring activities remain
severely circumscribed because of limited resources.24 One UNHCR
legal consultant estimated that only about six percent of the cases at the
Whitehead detention facility are monitored in the first instance.4 7
2.

Malaysia

Elsewhere in the region there has been some slowness
implementing the screening and review procedures, although the efforts
have been serious. In terms of the need for legal services and assistance
for asylum-seekers in Malaysia, despite the very close involvement of
UNHCR legal officers at all stages of the screening procedure there,
additional counselling and legal assistance resources are needed. The
UNHCR repeatedly emphasizes the office's role to monitor adjudicators,
and not to provide either advocacy on behalf of specific claims or to
adjudicate cases " 8 Clearly, more legal assistance is necessary for
Vietnamese boat people in Malaysia, and a strong case can be made for
the development of self-help materials that would permit asylum-seekers
to assist themselves in the screening and review procedures." 9
3.

Analysis and Recommendations

Several measures could be taken to respect human rights and
refugee law in screening and review procedures under the CPA. In Hong
Kong, the government and UNHCR should establish a volunteer prescreening legal counselling program for Vietnamese boat people. A
volunteer project could work in Hong Kong with its western legal system
and rich commercial activities, and local lawyers have taken up such an
initiative. Funding resources and foreign lawyer support would be
forthcoming in such an endeavor.'
Such a project would benefit the
individuals counselled as well as permit a strong case to be made for the
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra

note 49, at 17.

Id.
Interview with UNHCR officials in New York (Feb. 1990).

Id.
See AMNESTY
Id. at 17.

INTERNATIONAL,

supra note 49, at 15.

See Griffin, supra note 241, at 2, col. 1.
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investment of resources at the outset of the screening procedure. CPA
implementation in Hong Kong, to a great extent, has been compromised
by the early evolution of an immigration screening procedure before the
UNHCR was in a position to monitor the effort adequately." A series
of safety net measures have been taken to deal with a procedure that went
awry in the first instance, including the establishment of the Refugee
Status Review Board,' 2 recent improvements in Board procedures, 3
the use of the UNHCR mandate procedure in Hong Kong,' and even
judicial challenges to the screening and review mechanisms.~' 5 The
need for perhaps inevitably inadequate safety net measures could be
reduced by the investment of an appropriate level of resources at the
outset of the procedure.
In terms of more general observations, it is worth noting that
where UNHCR is most directly involved in the status determination
procedure, the process seems more calculated to give the benefit of the
doubt to asylum-seekers.'
Where, on the other hand, immigration
enforcement elements are more involved, the procedures are
correspondingly more restrictive. Specifically, in Indonesia and Malaysia,
where UNHCR is effectively involved in the status determination
procedure, results seem to be relatively generous. In Hong Kong,
however, where the immigration authorities have taken primary
responsibility for determining refugee status in the first instance, results
seem more restrictive.
Also, there is a clear need in the region for comprehensive and
specific information about current conditions in Vietnam in order to
support the various adjudicatory processes. A region-wide approach
toward the development of country of origin information is needed for the
251. See Interview with Michael Hansen, supra note 178.
252. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 49, at 9-13.
253. id.
254. According to Refugee Coordinator Michael Hansen, the Hong Kong
government has accepted that UNHCR will have an opportunity prior to any deportation
of boat people to determine under its mandate whether any are deserving of refugee
protection. If so, the Hong Kong authorities will abide by the determination and treat
the individuals as refugees. UNHCR branch office officials, however, have expressed
reservations about a systematic use of the mandate power given resource limitations. In
fact, according to UNHCR, the mandate has been used in a relatively small number of
instances, 40 cases involving 105 individuals. Interview with UNHCR officials in Hong
Kong (May 1990).
255. See Refugee Lawsuit, supra note 195, at All, col. 1.
256. See HANDBOOK, supra note 54, paras. 203-04, at 48.

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VIII

use of advocates and adjudicators. Collection of information would
permit the development of group profiles and evidentiary presumptions
that could be relied upon to accord status on an expedited basis. 7 Any
such project should probably be located outside of the formal structure of
the UNHCR in order to avoid institutional concerns about monitoring
human rights conditions in the countries of origin of refugees. Additional
personnel will be required to organize and implement an information and
documentation project, apart from those who are currently working on
adjudications in the region.
Consideration should also be given to enhancing the available
training on refugee criteria and status determinations." s As the
procedures and possibilities for UNHCR and nongovernmental
interventions vary according to the particular system, it may be necessary
to undertake aspects of such an effort on a country-specific basis.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In a statement issued in Manila on May 16, 1990, various
countries in Asia announced that after fifteen years of providing
temporary asylum to Vietnamese boat people, the "burden has become
intolerable and cannot continue."I These countries of temporary
refuge called for the lifting of a moratorium on forcible repatriation as of
July 1, 199 0.' ° Vietnamese who have been screened out as "nonrefugees" and who do not volunteer to return to Vietnam would be subject
The statement emphasizes that countries of first
to deportation."
asylum "reserve the right to take such unilateral action as they deem
necessary to safeguard their national interests, including the abandonment
of temporary refuge" failing an agreement on "even an intermediate
solution to the ...

problem. " 2

257. See FED. R. EviD. 301. The United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service has used country profiles in refugee admissions determinations. See Helton,
Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basisfor Refi gee Status,
15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 50 n.80 (1983).
258. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 4, at 5.
259. Statement by Countries of Temporary Refuge meeting in Manila on 16 May
1990, at 1 [hereinafter Statement]. On the agreement between Vietnam, Great Britain
and UNHCR on the repatriation of certain Vietnamese boat people from Hong Kong, see
Some Boat People Will Be Returned, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1990, at A9, col. 1.
260. Statement, supra note 259, at 2.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 3.
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There has been a tremendous investment made by the office of the
UNHCR toward the implementation of the CPA.' It is too early to tell
whether this approach will be successful involving, as it does, the
imposition of Western concepts and procedures on systems with few
analogous legal traditions. Serious efforts have been undertaken to
establish screening mechanisms, and, depending on the particular system,
UNHCR has been able to play a positive role in furtherance of these
However, screening and appeals
adjudicatory arrangements.'
procedures under the CPA are in urgent need of improvement to ensure
that genuine refugees are recognized and offered protection, including
better training and a system to collect and disseminate information about
current conditions in Vietnam.
There is no easy solution to the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia,
and the countries of the region are in a difficult dilemma. There may be
many policy options, but there are also constraints under human rights and
refugee law. Respect for the fundamental human rights of refugees will
surely promote the search for durable solutions.
Western donor and resettlement governments should monitor
compliance with the CPA's guidelines for treatment of new arrivals in
countries such as Thailand. Ready access is necessary to safeguard and
rescue arriving boat people as well as to investigate alleged piracy attacks.
Receiving countries must respect the fundamental human rights of
asylum-seekers, including the right to be free from arbitrary, prolonged
detention. Currently, for example, about 50,000 Vietnamese boat people
Such deterrence measures are
languish indefinitely in Hong Kong.'
standards that must be
the
humanitarian
inhumane and incompatible with
achieved in order to address the problem.
The donor and resettlement governments should monitor the
screening process in order to ensure that criteria are, indeed, applied
according to the "humane measurer" called for in the CPA.' As yet,
many consider that the UNHCR has been unable to ensure application of
reliable and fair procedures in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong. 7
Direct governmental intervention may be needed in order to achieve an
appropriate screening mechanism.

See generally Co-ordinating Committee, supra note 62, at 1.
See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 49, at 51-54.
See Erlanger, supra note 217.
InternationalConference, supra note 5, at 11.
267. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 49.
263.
264.
265.
266.
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There is much cause for concern, and the improvements proposed
in this article could contribute to the establishment of fair adjudication
systems. Whether by virtue of gross disregard for arrangements under the
CPA, such as the Malaysian redirection policy, or in a more calibrated
form of noncompliance, such as the restrictive and unfair Hong Kong
screening procedure, the lives of refugees are at stake.

